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Abstract
This paper suggests that institutional factors which reward social net-
works at the expenses of productivity can play an important role in ex-
plaining brain drain. The e¤ects of social networks on brain drain are
analyzed in a decision theory framework with asymmetric information.
We distinguish between the role of insidership and personal connections.
The larger the cost of being an outsider, the smaller is the number and the
average ability of researchers working in the domestic job market. Per-
sonal connections partly compensate for this e¤ect by attracting highly
connected researchers back. However, starting from a world with no dis-
tortions, personal connections also increase brain drain.
JEL codes: D82, F22, I20, J24, J44.
Keywords: Brain Drain, Social Networks, Institutions, Asymmetric In-
formation, Italian Academia.
1 Introduction
American universities attract 34% of all foreign students from the OECD area,
followed by British Universities which attract 16%. While these academic sys-
tems are ourishing, others, like Italy, Greece, Portugal etc. are left behind.
This raises the question of what makes some countries more exposed to brain
drain than others.
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Brain drain has often been attributed to the scarcity of funds in the research
sector (low wages, lack of employment opportunities etc.). Most proposals have
suggested to increase the investments in R&D. While we recognize that mon-
etary factors may play a role, they are far from telling the full story. Perotti
(2002) compares the Italian and the UK academic systems which are both al-
most entirely public. He shows that if anything, Italian universities are better
funded per academic sta¤ or student, than British universities are.
Previous economic studies suggest asymmetric information as a potential ex-
planation for brain drain1 : employers in foreign countries have better knowledge
of studentsproductivity than employers in the country of origin. We propose a
slightly di¤erent source of asymmetric information: foreign PhD programs (for
instance in the US or in the UK) give a more accurate signal of the students
ability than domestic PhD programs. This informational asymmetry is due to
the larger di¤erentiation with respect to quality of the American and British
universities compared to their counterparts in the rest of the world2 . How-
ever, asymmetric information alone does not give an exhaustive picture of the
brain drain phenomenon. It can not explain why individuals with equal abilities
choose di¤erent career paths. Therefore, something important is missing.
We suggest that domestic institutional factors which reward social networks
at the expenses of productivity can play an important role in explaining the
brain drain phenomenon. Institutions are here taken to be as "agreements
shaping repeated human interactions" (Frey 1999: p.3). Examples of institu-
tions include: decision making systems, norms, regulations, and any type of
behavioural rules, regardless of whether they are formally laid down or not.
The economics literature on migration shows that migrant social networks at
points of destination strongly a¤ect where individuals choose to migrate3 . So-
cial networks reduce the cost of migration by providing information and direct
assistance, especially for job search4 . By analogy, one could expect that social
networks in the country of origin also inuence the choice to migrate. On the
1See Kwok and Leland (1982),(1984), Katz and Stark (1984), and Lien (1987).
2The US and the UK can boast top universities, such as Harvard, Princeton, LSE, Warwick
etc.. but there are also very bad and unknown universities. It seems reasonable to assume that
conditional on the choice to go abroad, and given their abilities, students try to be admitted
in the best university. Thanks to the thorough selection process of the American and British
PhD programs - and the possibility of being expelled from the program if one turns out not to
be su¢ ciently good to face the challenge-, the ranking of the university in which the student
gets the PhD gives a strong signal of his/her ability: a student coming from an Ivy League
is expected to be of top ability, while a student coming from the university of Tolsa to be of
low ability. One could reasonably infer that a student only went to Tolsa because he was not
admitted to a better university. The same argument does not apply to the same extent for
the PhD in the home country. For instance, conditional on remaining in the home country,
the distinction between outstanding and very good students is more di¢ cult to make if there
are no universities of the same calibre as the Ivy Leagues.
3These studies refer to migration ow from Mexico to the USA. See Winters et al. (2001)
and Wilson (1994). Additional literature on how social networks a¤ect migration include:
Taylor (1986), Massey (1987), Boyd (1989), Banerjee (1991), Gurak and Caces (1992), Neu-
man and Massey (1994), Chau (1997) etc. On the role played by latent and direct information
on migration outcomes see Banerjee (1984).
4See for instance Boyd (1989), Gurak and Caces (1992), and Menjivar (1995).
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one hand, individuals with extensive social networks in the home country have
less incentive to move abroad. They can exploit the assistance of their local
connections to nd jobs which are better than the ones they would get abroad5 .
On the other hand, if social networks are an important determinant of success
in the domestic job market, individuals with few networks may be penalized by
remaining in the home country. The overall e¤ect on brain drain is ambigu-
ous. We analyze this issue in a decision theory framework with asymmetric
information about individualsabilities.
As far as social networks are concerned, it is important to distinguish be-
tween the role of personal connections and of insidership. The former refer to
any - direct or indirect - non-professional connections with powerful members of
the domestic research community. These include family, friends, and close ac-
quaintances. These networks can be viewed as those discussed in the sociology
literature as "strong-ties" networks6 or, as the "family networks" in Winters et
al. (2001). These social networks represent an exogenous source of heterogene-
ity among aspiring researchers. Individuals with extensive personal connections
have better access to the domestic job market thanks to their privileged in-
formation, personal recommendations, etc. In our model, this is translated by
assuming that in the domestic job market, individuals with extensive personal
connections receive better job o¤er compared to their expected ability, while
individuals with few personal connections receive worse job o¤er compared to
their expected ability.
By doing the PhD in the home country, students become "insiders" in the
domestic research community network. They get to know the local research en-
vironment, they can create relationships with their professors, they have easy ac-
cess to information etc. These networks can be viewed as those discussed in the
sociology literature as "weak-ties" networks or, as the "community networks"
in Winters et al. (2001). Depending on the domestic institutions, insidership
can strongly penalize researchers coming from abroad, namely the "outsiders".
For instance, if universities do not compete for governmental funds, professors
have much more incentive to promote their own PhD students regardless of
productivity concerns7 . This is also likely to happen in hierarchical academic
systems, where researchers are accountable to a specic academic chair rather
than to the department. Similarly, extensive bureaucracy and regulations which
discriminate against foreign certicates contribute to increase the "cost of being
an outsider". This cost is introduced in our model by assuming that individuals
who do their PhD abroad and work in the domestic job market receive a worse
job o¤er than their expected ability.
We build a simple model to investigate who has the incentive to leave the
5This holds if social networks in the home country are not positively correlated with social
networks abroad, or, as we assume in our model, that the foreign job market is not distorted
by social networks.
6See Wilson (1998).
7 It is worth noting that insidership could potentially be used to solve an asymmetric infor-
mation problem: professors promote their own students because they have a better knowledge
of their ability. However, this paper refers to those cases in which professors promote their
own students regardless of their ability.
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home country and who doesnt. Aspiring researchers can decide to go abroad for
the PhD, after the PhD, both, or never. We predict the following stylized results:
No researcher does the PhD in the home country and works in the foreign job
market. Regardless of their abilities, students with few personal connections
do the PhD abroad and remain abroad. Researchers with low abilities and
extensive personal connections never go abroad. Unless the cost of being an
outsider is very small, only top ability students with extensive initial connections
study abroad and return to the home country afterwards. More importantly,
our model predicts that researchers working in the foreign job market have, on
average, higher abilities than researchers working in the country of origin.
Our comparative analysis shows that in the presence of informational asym-
metries, insidership increases brain drain. As the cost of being an outsider
becomes larger, more individuals choose to do the PhD in the home country,
but both the number and average ability of researchers working in the domestic
job market decrease. Personal connections partly compensate for this e¤ect by
attracting highly connected researchers back. However, starting from a situa-
tion where being an outsider is not costly, personal connections also increase
brain drain. We conclude that overall, institutional mechanisms which reward
social networks in the home country increase brain drain.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe
the model. Section 3 shows the equilibrium properties. Section 4 provides a
comparative analysis. Section 5 describes the special case of the Italian academic
system. The discussion of the results, extensions, and policy recommendations
can be found in section 6 and 7. Section 8 concludes. All proofs are in the
appendix.
2 The Model
Consider the following environment: aspiring researchers with heterogeneous
abilities and personal connections must choose their career path given the ex-
pected job o¤ers8 made by foreign and domestic employers (mostly universities,
but also private or public research entities etc.). Abilities are uniformly dis-
tributed over the range [a; a], where a is strictly positive. Similarly, personal
connections are uniformly distributed over the range

k; k

, where k = 2k0k0+k1 > 0
and k = 2k1k0+k1 , so that E [ki] =
k+k
2 = 1
9 . Abilities and personal connections
are orthogonal10 .
Individuals abilities are not directly observable by employers. However,
PhD programs can be used as signalling devices. We assume informational
8Job o¤ers may have properties beyond the wage. They can also represent the prestige and
the duration of the research position. One could also interpret it as the expected probability
of getting a job multiplied by a xed wage.
9What is relevant for our model is the relative value of family connections - compared to
the average- rather than the absolute value.
10For an easier tractability we assume uniform distributions. However, the results still hold
under much more general distribution functions as long as personal connections and abilities
are independent.
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asymmetry between foreign and domestic PhD programs: while the former give
a perfect signal of the individualsabilities, the latter is fully uninformative11 .
Aspiring researchers must also choose in which job market to apply after they
complete their PhD. We assume that due to institutional factors, the domestic
job market is distorted by two types of social networks: personal connections and
insidership. Contrary to what happens abroad, job o¤ers in the home country
do not fully reect researchersabilities. Job o¤ers are discounted (augmented)
if individualspersonal connections with the domestic research community are
below (above) average12 . Thus, by denition, personal connections are observ-
able by domestic employers only13 . Insidership operates as a cost of doing the
PhD abroad if one returns to the home country afterwards. Throughout the
paper we refer to it as "the cost of being an outsider". The latter, dened by
B 2 [1;1), reduces the job o¤ers of individuals who return to their country of
origin after completing the PhD abroad14 .
Aspiring researchers can choose among four career paths:
- doing the PhD abroad and working in the foreign job market (AA)
- doing the PhD in the home country and working in the foreign job market
(HA)
- doing the PhD in the home country and working in the domestic job market
(HH)
- doing the PhD abroad and working in the domestic job market (AH)
Consistently with Lien (1987), individuals, before deciding whether to study
abroad or not, consider explicitly whether they will want to return to the home
country or remain abroad. We assume no job rationing: every individual can
be employed in the job market where he applies. What varies are the job o¤ers
that researchers receive. This assumption rules out the strategic interactions
between individuals.
Researchers doing the PhD abroad and applying to the foreign job market
receive a job o¤er equal to their true ability. Thus the job o¤er of a researcher
with ability ai will be:
wAA = ai (1)
Researchers doing the PhD in the home country and applying to the foreign
job market receive a job o¤er equal to the average ability of all researchers who
choose the same path:
wHA = E(aijHA) (2)
11For easier tractability we assume that PhD programs abroad give a perfect signal of stu-
dentsability, while PhD programs in the home country do not give any additional information
on studentsability. However, for the results to hold, it is su¢ cient that PhD programs abroad
give a more accurate signal than PhD programs in the home country.
12 Indeed, the benets one gets from own social networks usually depend on their relative
size rather than on their absolute size.
13The results would not change if one assumed that personal connections with the domestic
research community could be signaled to foreign universities through the letters of recommen-
dations.
14We assume B to be homogenous across individuals to emphasize the fact that insidership
is not used as a solution to the asymmetric information problem. The cost of being outsider
is the same regardless of abilities.
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Researchers doing the PhD in the home country and applying to the domestic
job market receive a job o¤er equal to the average ability of all researchers with
the same personal connections who choose the same path, discounted or aug-
mented by ones own personal connections with the domestic research commu-
nity. Thus, the job o¤er of a researcher with ability ai and personal connections
ki will be:
wHH = kiE(aijHH;ki) (3)
By doing the PhD in the home country, these researchers can not signal their
ability. If researcher i has average personal connections with the domestic re-
search community (ki = 1), he receives a job o¤er which reects his expected
ability. If researcher i has few personal connections (ki < 1), he receives a worse
job o¤er compared to his expected ability. If researcher i has extensive personal
connections (ki > 1), he receives a better job o¤er compared to his expected
ability.
Finally, researchers doing the PhD abroad and applying to the domestic
job market receive a job o¤er equal to their true ability, discounted by the
cost of being an outsider, and discounted or augmented by ones own personal
connections with the domestic research community. Thus the job o¤er of a
researcher with ability ai and personal connections ki will be:
wAH =
ki
B
ai (4)
By doing the PhD abroad, these researchers can signal their true ability. Re-
searchers whose personal connections are so extensive to more than compensate
for the cost of being an outsider (ki > B) receive a better job o¤er compared
to their true ability, while the remaining researchers receive a job o¤er which is
worse than their true ability.
We now solve the model and identify the properties of the equilibrium.
3 Properties of the equilibrium
Equilibrium will be described by four sets of individuals (which may be empty):
a rst set of individuals who study and work abroad, a second set of individuals
who study abroad and return to the home country, a third set of individuals
studying and working in the home country, and a fourth set of individuals who
study in the home country and leave afterwards.
Proposition 1 Conditional on working in the foreign job market, individuals
are always better o¤ by doing the PhD abroad than in the home country.
Intuitively, for any individuals type, strategy (HA) is dominated by strategy
(AA). To see that, suppose that among the individuals who work abroad, those
with above average abilities got the PhD abroad, while the remaining individuals
got the PhD in the home country. Then, the average ability of the individuals
who chose (HA) would be a+a4 . Because of asymmetric information, the job
6
o¤er by foreign universities would also be a+a4 . But those individuals whose
ability is in the range
h
a+a
4 ;
a+a
2
i
could have had a higher job o¤er if they
signaled their ability by doing the PhD abroad. So these individuals would
choose to do the PhD abroad. It follows that the average ability of individuals
choosing (HA) becomes a+a8 . But again, individuals whose ability is in the
range
h
a+a
8 ;
a+a
4
i
could have a higher job o¤er if they signaled their ability by
doing the PhD abroad, and so on... until the average productivity of individuals
choosing (HA) is equal to a and all individuals who have the incentive to work
in the foreign job market prefer to do the PhD abroad15 .
Corollary 2 In equilibrium, E(aijHA) = a. No individual does the PhD in the
home country and works in the foreign job market.
Proposition 3 a) Individuals with few personal connections (ki < 1) study abroad
and remain abroad. b) Individuals with extensive personal connections (B  ki > 1)
study and work abroad if and only if their abilities satisfy:
a  ai  min

kia
2 ki ; a

(5)
Individuals with few personal connections always prefer to undertake a re-
search career abroad since they would be penalized in the domestic job market.
According to proposition 1, conditional on working abroad, it is always optimal
to do the PhD abroad. Individuals with extensive personal connections can still
decide to study and work abroad if their ability is high enough to more than
compensate the opportunity cost of not exploiting the personal connections.
Proposition 4 Individuals who study and work in the home country have ex-
tensive personal connections (ki > 1) and abilities such that:
ai < min
n
kia
2 ki ;
Ba
2 B ; a
o
(6)
In general, individuals for whom inequality (6) holds, choose (HH) for a
combination of reasons: they dont have a strong incentive to signal their
ability by doing the PhD abroad, and they can exploit their personal con-
nections in the domestic job market. More specically, individuals for whom
ai < min
n
kia
2 ki ;
Ba
2 B ; a
o
= kia2 ki , have not enough personal connections
to study abroad and to return to the home country afterwards, because ki < B.
Besides, the opportunity cost of working and studying abroad - namely, the non
exploitation of personal connections- is too large compared to the benet of sig-
nalling their ability, which is low. Thus, they will choose to study and work in
the home country. Individuals for whom ai < min
n
kia
2 ki ;
Ba
2 B ; a
o
= Ba2 B
, have too large personal connections (ki > B) to decide to work abroad. Fur-
thermore, they dont have abilities high enough to justify studying abroad and
15Except for individuals with abilities equal to a who are indi¤erent between (AA) and
(HA). For a more formal proof of proposition 1 and corollary 2 see the appendix.
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becoming an outsider. Therefore, they choose to study and work in the home
country.
Proposition 5 Individuals who study abroad and return to the country of origin
afterwards have very extensive initial networks (ki > B), and abilities such that:
a  ai  min

Ba
2 B ; a

(7)
Returning to the country of origin after completing the PhD abroad can
only be a¤orded by top ability individuals whose personal connections are so
extensive to more than compensate for the cost of being an outsider
 
ki
B > 1

.
In the second stage, individuals with such extensive personal connections are
better o¤ by working in the domestic job market. In the rst stage, they nd
it optimal to invest in signalling their top abilities at the expenses of becoming
an outsider. The results above are summarized in gure 1.
Corollary 6 In equilibrium, individuals working in the foreign job market have,
on average, higher abilities than individuals working in the country of origin.
This result is consistent with some empirical evidence. Perotti (2005) shows
that Italian professors abroad are on average much more productive - in terms
of scientic publications- than Italian professors in the home country. The
di¤erence in productivity is strongly signicant.
We now turn to the comparative analysis.
4 Comparative analysis
We investigate how personal connections and insidership a¤ect the brain drain
equilibrium.
Proposition 7 The higher the cost of being an outsider, the larger is the num-
ber and the average ability -E(aijHH;ki)- of students doing the PhD in the coun-
try of origin .
Consistently with proposition 7, inequality (6) becomes less binding. The in-
tuition is quite straightforward: conditional on working in the domestic market,
as B increases, the cost of doing the PhD abroad increases. It follows that an
increasing number of students with higher abilities - who would have otherwise
done the PhD abroad - have now the incentive to do the PhD in the country
of origin. Whether this is desirable from a welfare point of view, is a delicate
issue. On the one hand, raising the average ability of students with a PhD from
the country of origin increases the attractiveness and the reputation of domes-
tic PhDs. On the other hand, a larger number of PhD students increases the
nancial burden on tax payers and the teaching burden on academic sta¤s. The
latter could, in turn, negatively a¤ect research productivity.
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Figure 1: This graph shows the optimal career path for each individual i with characteristics
(ki; ai) for a given value of B. Since ai and ki are independent and uniformily distributed,
to each point (ki; ai) in the graph is attributed the same density.
It is plausible to assume that a countrys decision-makers want to reduce
brain drain in the academic job market and in particular to retain and attract
researchers with higher abilities.
Proposition 8 In the presence of asymmetric information, the larger the cost
of being an outsider, the larger is the brain drain. More specically, both the
number and the average ability of researchers working in the domestic job market
are lower as B is higher.
In order to understand the role played by informational asymmetries, con-
sider the case where domestic PhD programs signal ability as accurately as
foreign PhD programs do. If this is true, according to our model, the choice
between working in the domestic or in the foreign job market only depends
on personal connections. If anything, an increase in B make some individuals
switch from strategy (AH) to strategy (HH). This does not change the number
or the ability of students choosing to work in the domestic job market.
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However, in the presence of informational asymmetries, as B increases, not
all individuals for whom strategy (AH) is no longer optimal now choose strategy
(HH). In the set of individuals choosing strategy (AH) prior to the increase in
B, only those with lower abilities and larger personal connections have now the
incentive to undertake the entire career path in the home country. Researchers
with higher abilities want to signal them, so they will do the PhD abroad. Since
coming back to the country of origin after doing the PhD abroad has become
more costly, some of them - those with smaller personal connections - have now
the incentive to undertake the entire career path abroad (AA). As a result,
the number and the average ability of researchers working in the domestic job
market decrease.
It is worth noting that ifB is large enough, such thatB > k orMin

B
2 Ba; a

=
a, then the set of individuals doing the PhD abroad and returning to the coun-
try of origin is empty. If doing the PhD in the country of origin becomes a
pre-condition to access the domestic job market, in equilibrium all researchers
study and work abroad except for those with either low abilities or very exten-
sive personal connections. On the other hand, if there is no cost of being an
outsider, namely B = 1, no individual does the PhD in the home country. The
intuition is that insidership is the only cost of doing the PhD abroad assumed
in our model. By setting B = 1, since it is equally costly to do the PhD abroad
or at home, all individuals have the incentive to signal their abilities by doing
the PhD abroad. Then, all those with extensive personal connections - half of
the distribution - return to the country of origin.
We now look at the e¤ects of personal connections on brain drain. By
assumption, what matters in our model is the inequality in the distribution
rather than the absolute value of personal connections. If the latter are equally
distributed, such that ki = 1 for every i , they have no e¤ects on researchers
job o¤ers. This corresponds to assuming that the domestic job market is not
distorted by personal connections.
Proposition 9 If being an outsider is costly (B > 1), personal connections play
a fundamental role in reducing brain drain. This is especially true the larger is
the inequality in the distribution of personal connections . However, starting
from a world where there is no cost of being an outsider, if anything, personal
connections increase brain drain.
By eliminating personal connections, if B > 1, the equilibrium is full brain
drain: all individuals study and work abroad. Following the same reasoning
as in proposition1, the initial decision of the best researchers to signal their
abilities lead all individuals to signal their abilities, and thus to remain abroad.
On the contrary, personal connections create an incentive to return in the home
country. Besides, for any given B, the more unequal the distribution of personal
connections is, the larger is k, and thus the larger is the set of individuals
studying abroad and returning to the country of origin after the PhD.
Now, suppose that asymmetric information is the only distortion in the
model. In this case, the model predicts that individuals are indi¤erent between
10
strategy (AA) and strategy (AH). This occurs because all nancial and personal
costs of leaving the country are omitted in our model. However, it is su¢ cient to
assume that there is a small cost "! 0 to live abroad, to obtain an equilibrium
where all individuals choose (AH). In this situation, adding personal connections
increases brain drain as all researchers with ki < 1 will now choose to remain
abroad.
The intuition for these di¤erent results is that while in the rst case personal
connections compensate for the cost of being an outsider, in the second case,
if anything, they create a cost to work in the domestic job market for the
individuals with few personal connections.
5 A special negative case: the Italian academic
system
The Italian case is often taken as an important example of governments fail-
ure in addressing the brain drain problem. Italy loses a high share of its own
skilled resources and is unable to attract skilled human resources from abroad.
Between 1996 and 1999, more than 2.300 Italian graduate students left the
country, while the share of foreign students in Italy was about 3%16 . We argue
that a major explanation for this high level of brain drain is given by Italian
institutional factors: the Italian mechanism of recruitment and promotion in
academia - the so-called "concorso" - rewards social networks at the expenses
of productivity. The recruitment process of researchers is not directly controlled
by the universities, but by a nationally elected committee whose members have
no reason to internalize the benets and the costs of the universities hiring
the researchers. Instead, each commissioner has the incentive to promote his
own candidates17 . Furthermore, the allocation of governmental funds across
universities is not based on scientic productivity. Therefore, most universities
have no incentive to change the current recruiting system by selecting more
productive researchers. Such institutional mechanisms promote favoritism and
manipulation by power groups18 .
As far as insidership is concerned, the cost of being an outsider in the Italian
academic job market must be very large. In order to advance in their career,
PhD students are often required to work without pay for very inuential domes-
tic professors - the so-called "barone". Students doing the PhD abroad obviously
wont have this "opportunity". Everything else being equal, this decreases their
chance of winning public competitions because they lack the protection of at
least one member of the commission. Empirical evidence shows that insidership
16These statistics are taken from Giannoccolo (2005)
17For more details on the concorsi procedure and for an excellent overview of how the
academic system works in Italy, see Perotti (2002). Many of the stylized facts used in our
model closely follow the charcteristics empirically analysed by Perotti (2002).
18For more details on the role of nepotism in the Italian academic system see the book
by Perotti (2008): Luniversità truccata. On the specic role of family connections see Nino
(2009): Quando luniversità è un a¤are di famiglia.
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is an important determinant of success in the Italian academic job market19 .
Several economic studies emphasize the negative e¤ects of insidership on po-
tential Italian returnees20 . Last but not least, the huge bureaucratic cost to
apply to the Italian domestic job market21 and the national regulations which
do not recognize foreign certicates22 for certain public competition strongly
contribute to penalize the outsiders.
The model can also explain some stylized facts of the Italian brain drain.
Consistently with proposition 1 and corollary 2, circumstantial evidence suggests
that only a small minority of Italian professors abroad got their PhD in their
home country. Similarly, in line with corollary 6, Perotti (2005) shows that
Italian professors abroad are on average much more productive - in terms of
scientic publications - than Italian professors in the home country.
However, it is worth noting that the negative e¤ects of brain drain in the
Italian academic system are likely to be underestimated by our model. The
wages of Italian researchers do not depend upon productivity. Besides, while
the wage are very low at beginning of the career, they increase substantially for
the professori ordinari (professors with permanent position).This means that
even if there were no asymmetric information problems, individuals with high
ability would want to work abroad to have a higher wage.
6 Discussion and extensions
This paper argues that the causes of brain drain can lie outside the nancial
sphere. As in Kwok and Lelands framework, low wages in the domestic job mar-
ket can be the result rather than the cause of brain drain. However, compared
to previous studies, we emphasize the role played by institutional factors in
addition to asymmetric information in explaining the brain drain phenomenon.
Asymmetric information, alone, can not explain why some individuals leave the
home country while other remain, unless as in Kwok and Leland (1982), one
19"By far the single most important determinant of success is being an insider." Perotti
(2002: p.21)
20"... scientists need to leave Italy to advance their careers but they also face massive
reintegration problems when they return . . . [she] attributes this paradox partly to the inuence
of the so-called barone, the professors who are allegedly the deal-makers in the university
jobs market, often requiring scientists to work for them for up to two years without pay in
order to progress. Mobex study, ESCR (2004)
 General lack of a relationship between excellence or performance and progression in Italy
with the result that stay-at-home Italians that had served their time in the academic system
were often privileged over and above well published and experienced potential returnees.
Morano Foadi (2003)
21See Perotti (2005) for a detailed overview of these costs.
22An example is the distinction that the Italian system makes between the specialization
school and the PhD, in some sub-elds related to the Biology discipline. While both require
to do research for 4 years in the lab, only the former is accepted to participate to some public
competition. It follows that any researcher coming from abroad will be a priori excluded from
the public competition.
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assumes exogenous preferences for working in the home country23 . We show
that a domestic job market which reward personal connections and penalize
outsiders - namely individuals who did not study in the home country - induce
most researchers with either high ability or small personal connections to start
a career abroad.
Our model can also explain why brain drain can vary across di¤erent aca-
demic disciplines and systems. Everything else being equal, we expect brain
drain to be larger in those disciplines where research is done in teams (such as
in science) and when the academic system is more hierarchical (researchers are
accountable to a specic professional chair rather than to the department). In
these contexts, the cost of being an outsider is likely to be higher because of the
stronger relationships between the domestic professors and their PhD students.
It is important to emphasize that our analysis is likely to underestimate
the negative e¤ects of these institutional factors on the research sector. Our
model does not directly take into account foreign researchers. The latter are
very likely to be outsiders and to have very few personal connections with the
domestic research community. Accordingly, our model would predict no foreign
researchers in the domestic job market. This is consistent with some empirical
evidence. Perotti (2005) points out that there are almost no foreign academics
in the Italian university system.
In practice monetary factors can also play a role in choosing whether to
leave or remaining in the home country. However, they do not change the
fundamental results of our analysis. Everything else being equal, if the level
of wages are lower in the domestic job market than in the foreign job market,
additional people will prefer to work abroad rather than in home country. This
can only increase brain drain.
One could claim that the large nancial costs of doing a PhD abroad - and
sometimes to start a life abroad - can bind students to the home country. While
this is certainly the case, it only partially a¤ects the results of our analysis.
Individuals who are more likely to be subject to nancial constraints have low
abilities and few personal connections. Nowadays, with the huge amounts of
money spent to promote international education and mobility, students with
high abilities are very likely to get scholarships to study abroad. On the other
hand, individuals with initially large personal connections usually come from
high social classes which can a¤ord to pay for expensive PhDs programs. To
the extent that this is true, what could change in our results is the choice of
part of individuals with low abilities and few personal connections: those who
can not a¤ord to move abroad, will undertake an academic career in the home
country. This means that if anything, adding nancial constraints to our model
reduces the brain drain of students with lower abilities. The remaining results
still hold.
23We think that an economic analysis should use "exogenous taste for home" as an intepre-
tation for exceptions in behavior rather than as the rule of behavior.
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7 Policy implications
Our analysis suggests that increasing wages may not be the optimal solution if
brain drain depends on institutional factors and asymmetric information.
Informational asymmetries can be reduced only to a small extent, as the
American and British academic systems are already far ahead: it will take a
long time before PhD programs in the rest of the world will be able to compete
with PhDs programs in Harvard, LSE, etc.. Any evaluation of policies against
brain drain should be made in a framework with asymmetric information.
Brain drain can nevertheless still be reduced by changing the institutions.
The comparative analysis above suggests that institutional changes should be
made rst to reduce the cost of being an outsider, and only subsequently, to
reduce the role of personal connections in the job market. Several options are
available to reduce the cost of being an outsider. As far as the academic sector
is concerned, regulations could prevent universities from hiring their own PhD
students right after they complete their PhD and encourage them to turn to
scholars coming from outside. Some economics departments, including Bocconi,
Toulouse, LSE etc. already adopt this policy. Similarly, protectionist regula-
tions should be abolished. If foreign certicates are not recognized to apply
to public competitions or to practice some professions (especially in medicine
and biology), the domestic job market will obviously become less attractive to
researchers with foreign PhDs.
Once the cost of being an outsider is reduced, policies should be taken to
weaken the inuence of personal connections in the domestic job market. Incen-
tive mechanisms should be designed to motivate domestic universities and public
research organizations to promote researchers based on their expected ability
rather than on their social networks. Researchers with foreign PhDs could then
internalize the entire benet of signalling their ability and thus will have an in-
centive to return to their home country. Potential incentive mechanisms include
a more competitive allocation of funds across public universities and research
centers. Government funds should be allocated more according to scientic pro-
ductivity and universities should be free to hire whoever they want. This should
induce them to select high abilities researchers rather than highly connected re-
searchers. In this respect, our model gives a potential explanation to the recent
empirical ndings by Aghion et al. (2007). They show a strong positive corre-
lation between universitiesautonomy in hiring, wage setting and funding with
research performance. According to our paper, institutional mechanisms which
encourage universitiesautonomy, reduce the social networks e¤ects that we dis-
cussed. As a result, the domestic job market becomes much more attractive to
high ability researchers from both abroad and the country of origin .
Finally, one could be concerned with inequality issues. On the one hand,
wealthy individuals are the most likely to be penalized by a high cost of being
an outsider. In fact, an increase in B, a¤ects those individuals who want to
study abroad and return to the home country afterwards, namely, those indi-
viduals with extensive personal connections - which we expect to be positively
correlated with social background. On the other hand, the job market distor-
14
tions due to personal connections harm in particular the poor individuals. This
is true even if personal connections were not correlated with social background.
Indeed, while wealthy individuals with few personal connections have always
the option to go abroad and get a job o¤er which reects their expected abil-
ity, poor individuals with few personal connections are likely to be nancially
constrained. They are stuck in the domestic job market and must accept a job
o¤er which is systematically lower than their expected ability.
8 Conclusions
Some countries, Italy being an example, are more strongly exposed to brain
drain compared to others.This papers proposes a new explanation for this phe-
nomenon: in addition to the common problems of scarcity of funds and asym-
metric information, institutional factors in the domestic job market can strongly
contribute to produce brain drain. Protectionist regulations and decision mak-
ing systems which reward social networks at the expenses of productivity strongly
penalize the "outsiders", namely the researchers who got their graduate educa-
tion abroad and who wish to go back to their country of origin. We show that
in the presence of informational asymmetries, as the cost of being an outsider
becomes larger, more individuals choose to do the PhD in the home country, but
both the number and the average ability of researchers working in the domestic
job market decrease. Finally, our model suggests that if being an outsider is
costly, personal connections reduce brain drain by attracting back some highly
connected researchers who studied abroad. However, starting from a situation
without such distortion, personal connections also increase brain drain. We
conclude that overall, institutional mechanisms which reward social networks in
the home country increase brain drain.
These results should be taken into account in the selection and evaluation
of policies against brain drain.
9 Appendix:Proofs
Proposition 1: We need to identify the set of individuals with characteristics
(ai; ki) who choose to take the PhD in the home country and work in the foreign
job market (HA). In equilibrium, the expected ability of the individuals in this
set must be equal to the job o¤er made by foreign universities. The latter do
not observe neither ki , nor ai , so they o¤er E(aijHA) to any job applicant.
We can divide individuals in three groups: those with few personal connec-
tions (ki < 1), those with extensive personal connections (B > ki > 1) and
those with very extensive personal connections (k > ki > B). Throughout the
proof it becomes more clear why we decide to distinguish between these three
groups only. We can dene the average ability of individuals choosing (HA) as
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follows:
E(aijHA) = 1
2
E (aijHA;ki<1)+(B)E (aijHA;B>ki>1)+

1
2
  (B)

E(aijHA;k>ki>B)
(8)
where 12 is the density of individuals with few personal connections, (B) =
BZ
1
f(ki)dki =
B 1
k k is the density of individuals with extensive connections and 
1
2   (B)

is the density of individuals with very extensive connections. We
now need to nd E (aijHA;ki<1), E (aijHA;B>ki>1), E(aijHA;k>ki>B). Let us set
E(aijHA) = e.
For individuals with ki < 1:
1) wAA > wAH , so they prefer (AA) to (AH).
2) wHA > wHH if and only if:
E(aijHA) > kiE(aijHH) (9)
Let us suppose that (9) holds. This assumption will turn out not to be relevant
since we will show that strategy (HA) is always dominated by either strategy
(AA) or strategy (AH). So we now have to compare choice (AA) with choice
(HA).
Individuals choose (HA) over (AA) if and only :
e > ai (10)
The average ability of individuals for which (8) holds is given by:
E(ai < e) =
eZ
a
aif(ai)dai (11)
Since f(:) is a uniform distribution, we get:
E(ai < e) =
a+ e
2
(12)
This means that in equilibrium:
E(aijHA;ki<1) =
a+ e
2
(13)
For individuals with B > ki > 1:
1) wAA > wAH , so they prefer (AA) to (AH).
2) wHA > wHH if and only if (9) holds. Let us suppose that this indeed the
case.
So again, individuals have to choose between (HA) and (AA). Individuals
choose (HA) over (AA) if and only if (10) holds.
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Following the same reasoning as above, in equilibrium we have:
E(aijHA;B>ki>1) =
a+ e
2
(14)
For individuals with k > ki > B:
1) wAH > wAA , so they prefer (AH) to (AA).
2) wHA > wHH if and only if (9) holds. Let us suppose that this indeed the
case.
Individuals have to choose between (AH) and (HA). Individuals choose (HA)
over (AH) if and only if:
e >
ki
B
ai (15)
The average ability of individuals for which this holds is given by:
E

ai <
B
ki

=
a+ Bki e
2
(16)
Since ki is not observable by foreign universities, they form their expectations
E(ki) knowing that equation (15) and (16) refer to individuals with very ex-
tensive personal connections (k > ki > B). This gives us E(ki) = k+B2 . In
equilibrium:
E(aijHA;k>ki>B) =
a+ 2B
k+B
e
2
(17)
Equation (8) becomes:
e =
1
2
a+ e
2
+ (B)
a+ e
2
+

1
2
  (B)
 a+ 2B
k+B
e
2
(18)
Solving, we get:
e =
a
3
2  
h
(B)

1  2B
k+B

+ 12
2B
k+B
i (19)
Thus, in equilibrium:
E(aijHA) = max
h
a ; min
 a
3
2 
h
(B)

1  2B
k+B

+ 12
2B
k+B
i ; a  i (20)
Now we show that E(aijHA) = a for every B. For this to be true it is su¢ cient
to prove that
(B)

1  2B
k +B

+
1
2
2B
k +B
 1
2
(21)
for every B. Rearranging inequality (21), we get
2(B)

1  2B
k +B



1  2B
k +B

(22)
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which always holds, since by denition:

0  (B)  12 for B < k
(B) = 12 for B > k

:
Because wHA = E(aijHA) = a , no individuals choose (HA). Any other job
o¤er can only be better than wHA .This follows from the fact that strategy
(HA) is always dominated by either strategy (AA) or by strategy (AH). This
also means that conditional on working in the foreign job market, it is always
preferable to take the PhD abroad.
Proposition 3a): For individuals with (ki < 1), wAA > wAH . This means
that individuals with few personal connections prefer to work in the foreign job
market rather than in the domestic job market after getting their PhD from
abroad. We now compare choice (AA) with choice (HH). First, we need to
calculate E(aijHH;ki<1) . Since, by denition, domestic universities observe the
personal connections of the candidates with their professors, both E(aijHH;ki<1)
, and wHH , can vary across individuals with di¤erent ki.
Individuals with (ki < 1) choose (HH) over (AA) if and only if:
kiE(aijHH;ki<1) > ai (23)
Let us set E(aijHH;ki<1) = e. The average ability of individuals for whom (23)
holds is:
E(ai < kie) =
a+ kie
2
(24)
In equilibrium:
e =
a+ kie
2
(25)
Solving, we get:
e =
a
2  ki (26)
We can conclude that:
E(aijHH;ki<1) = max

a ; a2 ki

(27)
Since ki < 1 , E(aijHH;ki<1) = a for every i. As a consequence, equation (23)
never holds. This shows that individuals with few personal connections always
choose to study and work abroad. (to be more precise those with ability equal
to a are indi¤erent between (AA) and (HA).)
Proposition 3b) & 4: We now investigate the choices of individuals with
extensive personal connections, (ki > 1). Again we should distinguish between
individuals with B > ki > 1 and individuals with k > ki > B:
For individuals with B > ki > 1:
1) wHH > wHA so they all prefer (HH) to (HA)
2) wAA > wAH so they all prefer (AA) to (AH).
Individuals choose (HH) over (AA) if and only if their ability is such that
inequality (23) holds. This means that in equilibrium, inequalities (25)and (26)
must hold too. In this case, since B > ki > 1, we can conclude that:
E(aijHH;B>ki>1) = min
  a
2 ki ; a

(28)
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Thus, individuals who choose (HH) over (AA) have abilities such that:
ai < min

kia
2 ki ; a

(29)
This proves proposition 3b).
For individuals with k > ki > B:
1) wAH > wAA , so they all prefer (AH) to (AA).
2) wHH > wHA , so they prefer (HH) to (AH)
Individuals choose between (HH) over (AH) if and only if their ability is
such that:
kiE(aijHH;ki>B) >
ki
B
ai (30)
Setting E(aijHH;ki>B) = e, this gives us:
Be > ai (31)
The average ability of individuals for whom the inequality above holds, is:
E(Be > ai) =
ai +Be
2
(32)
In equilibrium, E(Be > ai) = e , which gives:
e =
a
2 B (33)
We can conclude that:
E(aijHH;ki>B) = min
  a
2 B ; a

(34)
It follows that individuals who choose (HH) over (AH) have abilities such that:
ai < min

Ba
2 B ; a

(35)
Putting equation (29) and equation (35) together, individuals with ki > 1 who
choose (HH) have abilities such that:
ai < min
n
kia
2 ki ;
Ba
2 B ; a
o
(36)
Proposition 5: We want to identify the set of individuals who choose to study
abroad and to return to the country of origin afterwards. Strategy (AA) always
dominates strategy (AH) except for individuals with very extensive personal
connections k > ki > B. For those individuals, (AH) is preferable to (AA) and
(HH) is preferable to (HA). The condition under which (AH) dominates (HH)
is kiE(aijHH;ki>B) < kiB ai. Following the same procedure as above, our results
suggest that individuals who choose (AH), have abilities such that:
a  ai  min

Ba
2 B ; a

(37)
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Proposition 7: As B becomes larger, inequality (6) becomes less binding.
Individuals with abilities at the margin switch from strategy (AH) to strategy
(HH). Thus, both the number and the average ability of individuals doing the
PhD in home country increase. This is clearly shown in gure 1.
Proposition 8 : The larger is B, the lower is the number of individuals whose
personal connections more than compensate for the cost of being an outsider
(ki > B). The condition under which (AH) is preferred to (AA) becomes more
binding. Some high ability individuals with personal connections at the margin
switch from strategy (AH) to strategy (AA). The nal result is a lower number
and average ability of individuals working in the domestic job market. This is
clearly shown in gure 1.
Proposition 9 : Let us suppose that personal connections are equally distrib-
uted across individuals such that ki = 1 for every i, or that they do not matter
in the domestic job market. Job o¤ers in the domestic job market become:
wAH =
ai
B and wHH = E(aijHH;ki):It is clear that if B > 1, wAH < wAA for
every i. Thus, individuals must choose between (AA) and (HH). Individuals who
choose (HH) over (AA) have abilities ai < E(aijHH;ki): Setting E(aijHH) = e,
the average ability of this set is given by E(ai < e) =
a+e
2 : In equilibrium
a+e
2 = e, which gives: E(aijHH) = e = a. If there is a cost of being an outsider,
but personal connections do not a¤ect job o¤ers in the domestic job market,
there is full brain drain: all individuals whose ability ai > a choose (AA), while
individuals with ai = a are indi¤erent between (AA) and (HH). However, start-
ing from a situation where B = 1, wAH = wAA, so individuals will be indi¤erent
between remaining abroad or returning to the home country. By simply adding
a small cost of living abroad (nancial cost or personal cost of leaving the fam-
ily), we can assume that most people will return. Thus, if personal connections
are included in this world, individuals with ki < 1 will remain abroad, while
individuals with ki > 1 will return home. We can conclude that if anything,
personal connections increase brain drain when B = 1:
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